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Abstract: This paper presents a conceptual framework for the application of some
tools for assessing the quality and effectiveness of public governance. It demonstrates
assessing supply side governance using a framework of tracing the flows of expenditure (Selective Expenditure Tracking -SET) associated with the use of the investigation
fund service/programme and traces the chain of functions that are performed in the
course of the use of the Investigation fund (Functional Marker Analysis -FMA) policy of
the “Investigation fund” of Karnataka Police Department. The core objective of newly
developed framework is to evaluate the functions pertaining to as well as the funds
flow of the investigation fund, as per the guidelines. This tool can be an aid to governments for self-assessment of public policy and for reform. This framework considers a
supply side intervention as it can work when records and internal data of government
are openly accessible and receptive to the findings.
Keywords: public policy, governance, service delivery, public feedback

1. A Review of Demand Side Tools
There are several reasons why civil society groups began to proactively monitor government
programmes and services in recent decades. First, there was growing evidence of public dissatisfaction with the performance of governments and their agencies. In India and other developing countries, the vast majority of the people depend on government for essential services and entitlements. Failure of service delivery was a serious matter for them. Second, access to information exacerbated the problem and made people suspect that corruption and
other abuses of power in government were on the rise. Third, lack of access to essential services adversely impacted on the poor in particular. And even those who had access found it
cumbersome to interface with service providers and resolve their problems. It is a mix of
these factors that led to the emergence of a variety of tools and approaches that helped
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civic groups to monitor the functioning of governments and demand increased accountability and transparency, especially at the local level.
The shift from the earlier preoccupation with project design and appraisal and people’s participation in this process to the function of monitoring is an important landmark in the struggle for good governance. There was a time when people’s participation in planning projects
received much attention. It took some time for most people to realize that crafting a good
project or programme design does not guarantee positive outcomes. The design function is
necessary, but not sufficient to ensure “development effectiveness”. Furthermore, the mere
act of public expenditure on projects and services does not mean that the intended outcomes are achieved. The focus of monitoring is on whether the promised services and programmes have actually been delivered to the intended people, the first step towards development effectiveness.
The monitoring and demand side accountability tools being used by civil society activists in
India and other countries can be divided into three types:
•

Social audits in the form of public hearings

•

Community score cards – used at local levels

•

Citizen report cards –used at multiple levels

These tools are meant to strengthen the demand side of governance and focus on the use of
public (user) feedback on the services and entitlements that governments provide to citizens. Though the scope and methodologies involved may vary, their primary goal is to use
the feedback to seek remedial action or in a broader sense, demand accountability from
public service providers or other agencies of government. In recent years, governments have
also used these tools or have listened to their findings. A common feature of the tools is that
they seek information on the experience people have with public services or programmes.
The data thus collected are aggregated and analysed, and findings and recommendations for
action are derived from such analyses of experience. In general, these tools are used to arrive at conclusions or judgments about the overall performance of the programmes, services, etc., even though the evidence gathering itself may be partial in scope.
Since these tools share the same objective and have much in common, it is natural to conclude that they are interchangeable and that they can be used for any purpose or in any context. Often, those who use or are familiar with one tool may believe that it is superior or
more appropriate than the rest. It is important, therefore, to compare the features and limitations of these tools so that potential users can decide which of them is appropriate for
their purposes. A brief assessment of each is given below:

1.2 Social audits – Public Hearings
A key feature of this method is the assembly of the participants or users of a particular programme or service in a locality. Organisers (civic groups) make a prior announcement about
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the public hearing about the service or programme and encourage all those interested to attend the meeting. The actual modalities of this type of social audit may vary widely, but will
consist essentially of a public narration of the problems being faced by the participants.
Though there may be no structured discussion, the organisers tend to ensure that all the
problem areas are covered in the meeting. If service providers are present, they may be
asked to respond to the problems raised by the people. Though there may be no quantification of the problems or deeper analysis of the trends, the organizers will present their conclusions and proposed actions to the participants and officials (if present) at the end of the
meeting. Participants go home with the satisfaction that their “voice” has been heard, and
that some remedial action was likely to follow. Another positive feature is that social audits
of this kind can be organized at short notice and with minimal use of funds and expertise.
The exercise can be repeated in different localities and some insights gained on how a programme or service is functioning.
A good example of this mode of public audit is the “Jansunwai (Public Hearing)” conducted
by Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan. These public hearings made an impact because there was a focus on a specific programme, and its beneficiaries were willing to
speak out about the abuses in its operations. Since local officials were present at the hearings, interactions between them and the people took place, leading to some corrective actions on the spot. Diversions of funds, failure to pay stipulated wages, manipulation of muster rolls, etc., are examples of the problems on which evidence was presented in public.
Social audits of this kind can be useful exercises when organizers wish to make a quick assessment of the problems plaguing a programme and to publicise them in order to exert
public pressure on the agencies for reform. The focus on a single activity or programme
helps because only those interested in it would attend the meeting. The downside is that
those who attend the meeting need not be representative of the population being served by
the programme. A balanced assessment of the programme may be difficult to obtain
through this method. As a tool, it has inherent limitations in terms of scaling up, and aggregating the evidence from different localities. At the local level, where smaller populations
are involved, this tool can be effective for getting feedback on one programme or service at
a time.

1.3 Community Score Cards (CSC)
Community score cards represent a more structured version of the social audit discussed
above. A CSC gathers feedback on services/programmes through meetings of the community. Like a social audit, these meetings are planned in advance and members of the community are invited or selected to participate in the deliberations. The location and scope of the
meeting will be determined by the nature of the services/programmes under review. Village
level meetings are an accepted medium for gathering user feedback. A facilitator may guide
the deliberations so that answers can be elicited on specific issues or aspects of services.
Since there are no questionnaires or other survey instruments, the facilitator is charged with
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summarizing the deliberations and findings. This report or score card will reflect the experiences and concerns of the people who attended the community meeting. CSCs have been
attempted on local health services, for example, in some African countries.
If corrective actions can be taken at the village or community level, the CSC can be a useful
diagnostic aid. But if the service provider has a wider catchment area or if corrective actions
can be taken only at higher levels and for larger units, then similar CSCs will have to be prepared for all communities and aggregated. It is at this stage that problems of data, representativeness and aggregation tend to arise. Unless the questions, answers and their analysis are done on a uniform basis, aggregation could pose serious problems. The scaling up
problem here is similar to what obtains in local social audits. The positive feature of a CSC is
that it offers scope for members of the local community to participate in a process that
seeks their feedback and elaborate on their problems and possible remedies. Their motivation to monitor and demand accountability from the service provider may also be higher.
The downside is that in a group discussion, some persons could dominate and influence the
outcomes and findings, thus injecting biases that may be difficult to measure.

1.3 Citizen Report Cards (CRC)
Of the three tools, CRCs are the most structured and demanding in terms of organization,
financial resources and technical skills. The underlying methodology invariably calls for rigorous surveys, structured questionnaires, a comprehensive view of services/programmes, and
processes to elicit data without injecting biases, and analytical skills to identify and diagnose
strengths and weaknesses through the analysis of the collected data. CRCs, therefore, permit
scaling up the task of data collection to fit the levels at which corrective actions can be
taken. Its structured approach facilitates aggregation at the desired levels, and ensures representativeness and neutrality in the conduct of the exercise.
The Citizen Report Card (CRC) is a simple and credible tool to provide systematic feedback to
public agencies about various quantitative and qualitative aspects of their performance.
CRCs elicit information about users’ awareness, access, usage and satisfaction with public
services. In the context of poverty reduction programmes, it often complements the expert
analyses and conventional poverty monitoring indices with a “bottom-up” assessment of
pro-poor services. CRC identifies the key constraints citizens, especially the poor and the underserved face in accessing public services, their appraisals of the quality, adequacy of public
services and the quality of interactions they have with the providers of the services. CRC
studies provide a benchmark on quality of public services as experienced by citizens. CRCs
capture citizens' feedback in simple and unambiguous terms by indicating their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. For example, the most basic but clear feedback that a citizen may
give about the provision of Primary Health is total dissatisfaction. To appreciate this feedback, we must relate it to the ratings given to other dimensions by the same person. For example, satisfaction with the behaviour of doctors may be rated worse than availability of
medicines. When we look at these two pieces of information, we can conclude that
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provision of health services may be a cause of dissatisfaction, but the priority for corrective
action may be on improving the attitude and behaviour of doctors. Hence measures of citizens’ satisfaction across different dimensions of public services constitute the core of CRC
studies.
The Bangalore CRCs: A Short History
The first CRC exercise on Bangalore’s public services was launched by Dr. Samuel Paul in
1993-94 with the support of a small group of friends. It was a citizen initiative, with no
formal organisation behind it. The CRC findings were released to the press with a view to
informing the public and the Government about the sad state of public services. Dr. Paul
did not interact with the Government on the findings as he viewed the exercise as a catalyst to stimulate the public and the Government to respond.
The second CRC on Bangalore was done in 1999 under the auspices of the Public Affairs
Centre (PAC) that Dr. Paul had founded in 1994. This time the CRC findings were released
at a public meeting where heads of the major public agencies were also present. Agency
heads spoke at this meeting and interacted with citizens on the CRC findings and the way
forward. The Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) was set up by the Chief Minister soon
after this public meeting.
The third CRC on Bangalore was carried out by PAC in 2003. Its findings were presented at
a public meeting organised by BATF where the Chief Minister, other ministers, officials
and elected representatives were also present. The new CRC findings showed that some
of the reforms introduced by several public agencies had increased the satisfaction of citizens.
The fourth CRC (social audit) on Bangalore was prepared at the initiative of the State Government that asked PAC to undertake this project in 2011. The Planning Commission of
India has supported and financed this exercise. For the first time in Bangalore, what
started as a citizen initiative has been adopted by the State as a useful monitoring mechanism and a cost effective way to benefit from citizen feedback on public services.
Needless to say, for small local assessments of services and programmes, CRCs of this kind
will be uncalled for. Social audits and CSCs that entail fewer costs and skills are better suited
for such local exercises. Scale is thus an important consideration for the choice of the accountability tool in a given context. A second consideration is the multiplicity of the services
involved. Public services in a city are a good example. The ability to capture feedback on several services simultaneously is a unique advantage of CRCs. Many public agencies provide
multiple services and serve multiple population segments. Social audits and CSCs will not be
able to cope with the demands of such contexts and agencies. Similarly, wherever more
comprehensive assessments and regional comparisons are needed, CRCs have an inherent
advantage because more standardized and representative responses and evidence could be
generated through the CRC process. Finally, agency wide or government wide reforms can
be triggered more efficiently through the CRC route, a reflection of the scale advantage. It is
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unlikely that such reforms will come about through the evidence provided through partial or
local audit exercises.
Is the CRC process less participatory than the other two tools? On the face of it, it would
seem so. A survey is designed to gather feedback from an individual in privacy. There is no
scope here for group interaction. But the same is true of the democratic process where
while casting her vote, a citizen responds alone in secrecy. Yet voting is our most important
participatory right in a democracy. In CRCs, interactive participation of citizens is easier to
organize at the stage of thinking through the reforms signaled by the collective feedback.
Thus participation in CRCs works in different ways.
The foregoing review shows that despite their focus on the citizen perspective and their potential as aids to accountability, each of the tools discussed above has distinct advantages
and limitations. Each is better suited for certain purposes and contexts and not for others.
Choice and deployment of the tool should be based on a careful consideration of the factors
discussed above.
We now turn to the experience with CRCs. CRCs have now been tried and tested by a variety
of organizations in different contexts and countries. What started as a civil society initiative
has now been adopted also by governments and international development and donor
agencies. In India, the state governments of Delhi, West Bengal, Karnataka, Punjab, and Bihar have undertaken CRC exercises1. UNDP, World Bank, ADB, DFID and UNICEF have supported CRCs in several other countries and in India. CRCs’ applications in multiple sectors
and settings testify to its versatility and adaptability. Their role as a trigger for governmental
policy and institutional reform is also well established. Needless to say, not all CRCs have resulted in major reforms. A major lesson is that champions are needed both outside and inside governments to stimulate the reform process once CRCs are done.
Has there been any innovation or improvement in the CRC concept and methodology in the
past decade that witnessed its widespread adoption? In our view, not much has changed.
We have no doubt learned and fine tuned the tool and its processes over time. But no radical improvements or innovations have occurred. The technology being used, costs of surveys, types of analysis being undertaken, post-CRC reform links, all remain more or less the
same. Perhaps, we have not seriously invested in this effort. Or is it that there is nothing
more to be done?
TAG is a response to this concern. When a CRC is presented to a government, we expect its
leaders to initiate reform. In part, this stems from our belief that these leaders should have
ownership of the reforms. The CRC teams supported service providers effort by participating
in the discussions, stopping short of proposing reforms. So far, we have also not given them
a structured framework to strengthen their diagnostic power or a set of tools to guide the
reform process. It is this gap that TAG attempts to fill.
1

Both Public Affairs Centre and Public Affairs Foundation have assisted governments and international agencies in these efforts.
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2. TAG: Enhancing the Diagnostic Power of CRCs
The great merit of a CRC is that its analysis of public feedback can be an aid to the diagnosis
of the problems of governments and their service providers. CRC findings point to the gaps
and deficiencies that people have experienced in their interaction with public agencies. But
we do not go deeper into the factors underlying the problems thus identified. This is because those who respond to our survey do not have such information. Going deeper into the
problems is difficult also because the information required will be solely with the government.
Outputs of CRC –some examples
A. A Mirror to the Police – A Bottom-up Assessment of the Karnataka Police
Ø Findings: Demand for investigation money from complainants in spite of the existence of Investigation Funds (IF)
Ø Follow-up: Extensive awareness creation regarding IF
B. Monitoring Expenditure and Outcomes to improve Health Services for Urban Poor
Women in Bangalore
Ø Findings: Demand for money for check-ups
Ø Follow-up: Display of user fee and grievance redress charts
C. Assessment of BESCOM services
Ø Findings: Extensive use of middlemen at the time of applying for electricity connection
Ø Follow-up: Initiating online application system and public disclosure of procedural requirements.

Since governments now see the value of CRCs (see the box) the time may be ripe to explore
the feasibility of accessing the internal data of governments to sharpen the diagnostic process. There are two tracks of analysis that can take off from a set of CRC findings. CRCs typically shed light on both high and low performers among agencies. Within the same agency,
findings may point to regional variations. Behind such variations, there may be factors at
work that could be identified through further investigation. One promising track is to trace
the flows of expenditure associated with the activities of the service or programme. Did the
expenditure flows differ between the high and low performers? The endeavour here is to
see whether resource availability was a causal factor behind the differential performance.
Delays in the flow of funds and the quantum of the flows can be measured and compared.
We shall refer to this as Selective Expenditure Tracking of expenditure (SET).
The second track will trace the chain of functions that are to be performed in the course of
service delivery or programme implementation. We shall call this track Function Marker
Analysis or FMA. Identification of the levels of the organization and the sequence of func-
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tions involved will be the starting point in this investigation. Those responsible for the functions need to be identified thereafter. Specification of the time lies for completing the functions and other norms/standards to be applied also require to be made explicit. In brief,
FMA entails the identification and investigation of the following elements:
•

Levels of organization involved in policy and implementation

•

Specific functions to be performed at these levels

•

Policy makers/officials responsible for each function

•

Time lines prescribed for completing each function

•

Other norms/standards to be complied with by the officials

Each function can be further split into a set of decisions and actions for which an official is
responsible. The degree of disaggregation required will depend on the nature of the policy/programme. The last two elements stated above provide the criteria necessary to judge
how well a function has been performed. For example, if the given deadline or other norms
such as the full settlement of a payment or filing of a report have not been complied with,
the conclusion may be that the function has not been performed as planned.
It is also possible that different agencies are involved in some of the functions. For example,
one agency may receive a claim or complaint, and another agency may process the applications. When a complex chain of functions is unbundled, it should be possible to investigate
cases where the failure to perform certain functions as required may have contributed to
the differential performance in an agency or agencies. Like “biomarkers” in genetics, we can
now identify “function markers” that signal failures (success) in the performance of specific
functions. Research may help us to come up with a set of function markers in each of the
cases we study.
These two tracks of analysis, selected expenditure tracking (SET), and function marker analysis (FMA) can be used to extend and deepen the diagnostic power of CRCs.
Let us illustrate the application of this methodology to the Police Department of Karnataka
for which PAC had carried out a CRC project. One of the findings of this exercise is the variation between ranges/districts about the access to and use of the new investigation fund by
police stations. Awareness about the fund by police stations also varies. The two tracks of
analysis mentioned above can be deployed to understand the causes underlying the differential performance of the ranges/districts with regard to this fund. SET could be used to ascertain whether the flow of the new fund to the stations varied by range or district. Tracking
the funds flow from the DGP to the range, district and station is the task to be performed.
Was the access to and use of the fund greater in the stations that did not face delays in the
receipt of the fund and/or that received the full amount? It is possible that even when funds
were made available, a station may not have used it as planned? Here FMA could be used to
see where the delays or blocks occurred. If the fund was not used, which agency or level
failed to perform their assigned function? Identification of the functions and functionaries
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will assist the Department in zeroing in on the remedial actions required, including systemic
reform.

Figure 1. Funds flow

Through a recent discussion with the DGP, we learned that the investigation fund goes from
his office to the district and the police station (See Figure 1). Though “range” is the level immediately below the DGP, it was bypassed in the funds flow process. In effect, the funds
pass through three levels. An analysis of the budget and actual expenditure yields three indicators:
1. Expenditure components pertinent to the investigation fund
2. Delays in the flow of funds (planned vs. actuals)
3. Proportion of planned funds actually delivered
This case is complicated by the fact that funds will flow from the district to the station only
upon requests from the police stations. Why stations failed to avail of the fund will be the
question to explore if in fact there was poor utilization of the fund.
FMA can be a more complex analytical exercise, especially when multiple agencies are involved. In the police case, complexity may be much less as no other part of government is
involved. But the functions involved could be multiple that follow in a predictable sequence.
There are four levels in the organization. Conceptually, the sequences of functions relevant
to the investigation fund are the following:
•

Policy making

•

Operational guidelines

•

Budget allocation

•

Assignment of responsibilities

•

Training of staff
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•

Submission of claims

•

Approval of claims

•

Fund disbursal

•

Outcome monitoring

Mapping of the functions should be an essential step in any implementation plan. The set of
functions involved, the officials responsible for them, and the deadlines and other
norms/conditions given to them can be identified in the course of the study. These elements
may vary from one context or activity to another. Hence, the importance of identifying the
right markers in each case. FMA may show that some or all functions failed, were delayed, or
were left incomplete. The searchlight will then have to be directed to the underlying causes
through field interviews and study of records.
In the police case, the policy function was completed when the government decision to create the investigation fund for the specified purpose was taken. We need to see whether the
next set of functions such as guidelines, communication down the line, awareness building
at the constable level, assessment of the claims from police stations, etc., have actually been
performed. Markers that will pinpoint failures, non-compliance and delays will assist in this
process. The matrix of functions and responsibilities will show where these problems have
arisen.
Note that the CRC findings helped to put the spotlight on critical problem areas as mentioned in above box item. SET and FMA pursue these leads and deepen the diagnostic exercise. This approach avoids the need to investigate the full range of public spending by the
agency/department. It does not call for an analysis of the entire range of functions being
performed by the agency/department. In the police department, once we focus on the investigation fund, we need to apply FMA only to the functions and funds flow pertinent to
the utilization of the fund. Much time and money can be saved when the studies are sharply
focused on the relevant functions.
TAG can also be thought of as an aid to tackling the problem of implementation. It is often
said that the real problem in India is with the implementation of policies, programmes and
projects. Its implication is that policies and programme or project designs are fine, but that
they are not implemented properly2. If indeed this is true, a major challenge to the policy
maker is to find ways and means to deal with this problem. SET and FMA point to two important aspects of this problem that, when tackled, can bridge the implementation gap. Low
or inefficient utilization of funds and the failure or neglect of the functions public agencies
are expected to perform are basic reasons for the failure of implementation. TAG comes in
handy for policy makers to unbundle these problems and thus solve the implementation
puzzle.
2

This is not always true in reality. There are many policy and programme designs that are faulty and need to be
corrected.
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3. Investigation Fund: Funds Flow and Functions
A case study of the “investigation fund” established by the Police Department of Karnataka
was undertaken by PAC to test the feasibility of applying the TAG approach and to determine the efficacy of the fund’s utilization in selected districts during 2009-10. This Fund was
created by the police Department to make the investigation work of the Department more
efficient and timely, and to minimize the scope for corruption. There was a consensus in the
Department that inadequate funds not only delayed the investigation process, but also encouraged unhealthy practices of bribe taking and lack of accountability. An annual amount of
Rs. 20 crores was therefore set apart as an investigation fund for the districts and police stations to draw upon to meet the costs incurred by the staff in the course of their investigation
work.
The primary objective of the PAC study was to see whether the allocated funds had reached
the police stations as planned, and whether the functions to be performed at different levels
of the organization facilitated the funds flow and the investigation process. To track the performance of the investigation fund and the functions that go with it, we tested the newly designed ‘TAG’ in six Karnataka districts and three zones of Bangalore city. With TAG, we can
do two tracks of analysis, Selected/Specific Expenditure Tracking (SET) and Function Marker
Analysis (FMA) to extend and deepen the diagnostic power of CRCs. In addition to the investigation fund findings, by using TAG, we can trace the flows of expenditure associated with
the activities of the investigation fund service/programme (SET) and trace the chain of functions that are to be performed in the course of the investigation fund service delivery (FMA).
Visits to the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP), superintendent of police (SP), police inspectors (PI) and police stations were undertaken to interview the concerned officers and to
inspect the records3. Meetings with other senior officers were also held as required.
Figure 1 above has already shown the direction and levels of organization through which the
investigation fund is expected to flow. Figure 2 below shows how the fund has actually flown
and with what results. Thus, the released funds reached the districts in one week’s time
from the DGP’s office. However, Figure 2 shows that submission and processing time for
claims varied at the lower levels. As a result, timely disbursal did not take place in many
cases.

3

Field work and analysis of the data were carried out by K. Prabhakar and Meena Nair of PAC with funds from
the IDRC Think Tank Initiative of which PAC is a Grantee.
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Figure 2. Submission and Processing

Figure 3 depicts the chain of functions that had to be performed for the administration of
the investigation fund.

Figure 3. Chain of Functions

Figure 4 shows that the only function that worked as planned was the fund release by the
DGP’s office. There were problems with the implementation of all other functions. A careful
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look at the function failures shows that planning and supervision at the district level may
have been at fault. Staff orientation and training, standardization of practices, and review of
timelines are matters that needed to be organized at the district level. Irregular submission
of claims could have been better monitored and corrected at the police station level.

Figure 4. Fund release

Though DGP’s office performed the fund release function well, it appears that the function
of setting the guidelines could have been more thorough. These valuable insights into what
went wrong with certain functions and at what levels were brought to light by the application of TAG. We summarise below the detailed findings of SET and FMA on the investigation
fund.

4. Study findings and discussion
1. The guidelines on investigation fund utilization were received by all the DCP/SP
offices from the DG&IGP’s office within a week’s time.
2. All the DCP/SP offices have followed the guidelines regarding the amounts specified for different types of police stations.
3. All DCP/SP offices are getting funds quarterly in advance. None of the DCP/SP
offices have given any advance amounts to the stations; payments are made to
the stations only after receiving the claims.
4. There was no training or workshop conducted on the use of the fund by any office. Only a copy of guidelines and oral instructions were given on how the police stations can use this fund.
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5. It was observed that the police stations were submitting bills for claims at various intervals – monthly, quarterly and even half-yearly. However, in the recent
past, streamlining of the process seems to have taken place. In the past six
months, reimbursement claims have been made on a monthly basis by the most
Investigation Officers.
6. There was a time gap in circulating the guidelines on the investigation fund to
the districts, some receiving them after two months.
7. Since there are no specific guidelines on the channel to be followed for the
claims - there was some confusion on the routing of the claims by the police stations – whether they should reach the DCP/SP office directly or through proper
channels.
8. Investigation fund awareness was found to be low in Bangalore. Except for the
PI and Writer, most of the staff were not aware of the fund. But the same information was shared among the entire staff of the station in far off districts in
contrast to the state headquarters police stations. In Raichur, all of the station
staff were aware and they were clear that they could send claims directly to the
SP’s office.
The overall findings and areas for improvement under these two tracks are summarized below:

4.1 Fund Flow
•

As noted above, funds from the DGP to SPs have moved as planned. One week is
the average time taken for this flow of funds. The guidelines for the use of the
fund, however, did not reach all stations at the same time.

•

The flow of claims for reimbursement from the PIs to the SPs has been irregular.
Different districts have followed varying practices.

•

The time taken for processing the claims and sending reimbursements has also
varied widely between the districts. It is directly linked to the lack of uniformity
in the claims submission process.

•

Though delays have occurred and variations exist, fund flow has not faced any
serious roadblock. Nearly 90% of the funds claimed were released. If guidelines,
training and supervision are improved, fund flow can be made even more efficient and timely.

•

Claims are not linked to the performance of the investigation process. Though
crime numbers are available, no attempt is made to check whether the use of
the Fund has resulted in increased closure of cases, reduction in time taken or
the load of pending cases.
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4.2 Functions
•

Guidelines on claims processing and reimbursement could be further streamlined. Mapping of the sequence of functions to be carried out should be included in the guidelines. Linking expenditure to investigation outcomes also
needs attention. All these are functions to be strengthened at the DGP’s Office.

•

There is scope for improving the awareness of staff about the use of the Investigation Fund. This is primarily a function to be performed by the SPs. Some SPs
have been more proactive than others in this regard.

•

Claims processing needs greater attention as wide variations in the time taken
can be counter-productive. SPs need to find ways and means to make the process smoother while reducing the scope for possible abuses.

•

An overall finding is that the function of supervision by SPs needs to be
strengthened. Proper orientation of staff, adherence to the periodicity of claims
submission, time limits for processing, random checks of claims, and linking expenditure on claims to the efficiency of the investigation process are some tasks
that call for more systematic oversight.

Figure 5. Problems of fund flow

The problems highlighted in Figure 5 were identified through the use of SET and FMA. A CRC
by itself would not have discovered them as the internal records and data of the Police Department were essential for the underlying analysis. In the present case, TAG builds on the
Police CRC, but deepens the diagnosis, using information unavailable to the CRC.
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4. Conclusion
Civil society groups have approached governance and accountability issues primarily from
the demand side. TAG shows the potential for working on the supply side. Such interventions from the outside, however, can be effective only when governments are willing to
share their internal data with civil society or other professional groups. Needless to say, governments can apply TAG on their own initiative, without any pressure from civil society.
An important lesson to be learnt from this exercise is that those who make policies and implement them seldom have a systemic view of the actions to be taken at the different levels
so as to achieve the agreed upon policy goals. Often, agency leaders believe that those below will understand and follow their written orders. Since monitoring is neglected, supervisors may not even know that implementation had lagged behind, much less the reasons behind it. As a result, they may not realize, as in the police case, the need for awareness building or training at lower levels. Since the budget has been utilized, the authorities may assume that the policy or programme has been a success. If, however, they failed to link the
expenditure to the outcome in terms of the number of cases solved and the speed of investigation, there is no basis for judging the success of this reform (creation of the investigation
fund). The tracking and assessment of the functions enable policy makers to minimize such
problems by testing the validity of their assumptions and conclusions.
The analysis presented above also shows the links between SET and FMA. SET had shown
that though funds were received at the district level in one week, claim processing and disbursals were irregular and delayed. It will be concluded that the internal process is inefficient. An obvious recommendation based on SET would be to minimize these irregularities
and improve timely reimbursements. But what caused these problems in the first place and
at what points corrective measures need to be taken will not emerge from SET. For that, we
need to complete FMA. It is only through an analysis of the functions and functionaries at
different levels that we are able to learn that lack of training, varying practices, incomplete
guidelines, limited monitoring, etc., are the problems to be addressed. Linking SET and FMA
adds value to the analysis and assists in a systematic search for remedies.
The findings of the experiment described above confirm that TAG can be applied to real life
governance problems. It is also clear that data collection and analysis can be completed
within reasonable time and cost. Furthermore, we have shown that the evidence gathered
can be used to identify the problems that need to be tackled to improve funds flow and the
performance of functions. If TAG is applied to many more real life governance problems, we
will have adequate evidence to demonstrate that the value added by this approach justifies
the time and cost incurred in the process. It is only then that TAG will be considered a useful
aid to policy makers for the diagnosis of governance problems and the design of reforms.
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